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CaseNo.20080296-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
JUDY GIBSON, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to 
unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Defendant entered a guilty plea knowing that the full amount of restitution 
had yet to be determined and agreeing that the amount would be decided at a 
restitution hearing. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied 
defendant's motion to withdraw her plea, rejecting her claim that the plea was 
constitutionally unknowing, simply because she did not know the restitution 
amount? 
Standard of Review. An appellate court will overturn a trial court's ruling on a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea only when it is convinced that the trial court has 
abused its discretion. State v. Bedstead, 2006 UT 42, \ 7, 140 P.3d 1288. It will 
disturb findings of fact made in connection with a ruling on a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, attached in Addendum A, is 
relevant to the issue on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 3, 2004, the State charged defendant with unlawful dealing of 
property by a fiduciary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-513(2) and/or (3)(a) (West 2004), and with theft by deception, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (West 2004). R3-4. 
On June 21,2004, with the assistance of counsel, defendant pleaded guilty to 
unlawful dealing, and the State dismissed the theft by deception charge. R14. In the 
plea statement, attached in Addendum B, defendant acknowledged that she could 
"be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of [her] crime, including any 
restitution that may be owed on charges that [were] dismissed as part of the plea 
agreement/' R23. She agreed that "there [wa]s at least $55,220.00 due and owing in 
this matter/' but that "due to a dispute over other amounts," "the amoimt of 
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restitution [would] be determined at [a restitution] hearing [to] cover the time 
period April 7, 2002 to October 31, 2003." R24. In the plea statement, defendant 
certified, "I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, 
or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty." R25. 
The plea statement contained the following notice of defendant's right to 
withdraw her guilty plea: "I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea, I 
must file a written motion to withdraw my plea within 30 days after I have been 
sentenced and final judgment has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw 
my plea if I show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 
days for any reason." R25-26. 
The court ordered that the plea be held in abeyance for 36 months and placed 
defendant on probation for 36 months. R14-15. The court ordered that defendant 
pay full restitution as a condition of probation and scheduled a restitution hearing. 
R15. 
The restitution hearing was held October 8,2004. R39. Testimony was given 
that defendant had taken $55,221 by using her aunt's credit cards, $93,000 
($101,659.92 with interest) by mortgaging her aunt's home, and $81,305 by making 
checks to herself from her aunt's bank account. R195:7,12, 16. On October 13, the 
court entered a restitution order, setting the total amount of restitution at 
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$238,184.92 and requiring that defendant pay $2500 per month beginning in 
November 2004. R40. 
Defendant subsequently contested the amounts and calculations upon which 
the restitution order was based and moved to amend it. R42-47. The court denied 
the motion, ruling that the issues raised in defendant's motion had been fully 
addressed at the October 8 evidentiary hearing. R50. 
On January 5, 2005, the State filed a motion for an order to show cause why 
defendant should not be held in contempt for failing to make any of the monthly 
restitution payments the court had ordered. R53. On March 3, defendant appeared 
and admitted the allegations. R63. The court found defendant in violation of her 
probation, revoked probation and the plea in abeyance, and reinstated them, for 36 
months. R63-64. The court noted that $38,916.17 of the $238,184.92 restitution 
amount was being held in trust for the benefit of the victim. R64. The court 
therefore calculated the balance owing as $199,268.75 and ordered that defendant 
pay at least $2500 per month beginning in April 2005 and on the last day of each 
month thereafter. Id. 
Almost a year later, on March 7, 2006, the State filed another order to show 
cause, noting that defendant had made a payment of $18,316.29, which brought 
restitution payments current through October 30, 2005, but that she had made no 
further payments, thereby violating the court's March 3,2005 order. R69-71. 
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On June 22,2006, defendant, represented by new counsel, moved to withdraw 
her guilty plea. R110. Defendant alleged that her plea was unknowing because the 
total amount of restitution owing was "in dispute at the time of the plea" and that 
she knew neither the total amount of restitution nor the amount that would be 
required as monthly payments. R113, 115; see also R89-90 (defendant's affidavit 
averring that she did not knowingly and intelligently enter plea). She also alleged 
that the court had failed to advise her of the time limits within which to file a 
motion to withdraw the plea. R113. 
On December 4,2006, following briefing and oral argument on the matter, the 
court entered an order, determining that it had jurisdiction to entertain defendant's 
motion to withdraw, but concluding that defendant had pleaded knowingly. See 
R142-52 (findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying motion to withdraw 
guilty plea, attached in Addendum C). The court therefore denied the motion. See 
id. 
On June 18,2007, the court held a review hearing on the State's motion for an 
order to show cause. Based on the parties' stipulation, the court held that defendant 
had not complied with the plea in abeyance. R160. The court therefore entered 
defendant's guilty plea and set a sentencing hearing. Rl60-61. 
On March 17, 2008, the court held a sentencing hearing, and on March 18, 
2008, the court entered judgment. R178-80. Defendant has not included a transcript 
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of that hearing in the record on appeal. The pleadings indicate that the court 
sentenced defendant to a prison term of 1 to 15 years, suspended the prison term, 
placed defendant on probation for 12 months, and ordered that defendant spend 30 
days in jail and pay restitution as determined by her probation officer. Id. In a 
"sentence trust note/' the court ordered, "[Restitution to be pursued civilly[;] any 
credit card issues are not apart [sic] of criminal action." R179. 
On April 8,2008, defendant timely appealed. R183. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Melba Wisdom was defendant's elderly and incapacitated aunt. R195:6. 
Defendant took out credit cards in her aunt's name and used those cards to take 
money from her aunt. R195:7; R196:6. Defendant took out a mortgage on her aunt's 
home. R196:6. Defendant used proceeds from the mortgage for her own expenses. 
Id. Defendant also made out checks to herself on her aunt's checking account and 
signed the checks with her aunt's name. R195:15. Defendant used the proceeds 
from the checks for herself. Id.1 
1
 Defendant's presentence report contains additional information regarding 
the offenses. SeePSIat3-4. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion 
to withdraw her plea. Defendant knew that, as a consequence of her plea, 
restitution could be imposed. She knew that restitution could be imposed not only 
for the criminal conduct to which she admitted, but also for charges dismissed as 
part of the plea agreement. She agreed that at least $55,220 was owing. She 
acknowledged that a dispute existed as to other amounts, and she agreed to have 
the trial court determine the disputed amounts at a restitution hearing. Defendant 
thus knew the consequences, including the restitution consequences, of entering the 
plea. As a matter of policy, this court should decline to hold that a defendant must 
know the amount of restitution before she can enter a knowing plea. Such a 
holding would substantially limit the cases in which a plea bargain could be offered. 
Moreover, in this case defendant also knew what amounts she had 
misappropriated and therefore knew what her liability might be. In addition, the 
district court strictly complied with rule 11, thereby giving rise to a presumption 
that the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Defendant has presented no 
evidence to rebut that presumption. 
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ARGUMENT 
IN HER PLEA STATEMENT, DEFENDANT AGREED TO PAY 
RESTITUTION, ACKNOWLEDGED THE AMOUNT WAS 
DISPUTED, AND AGREED TO HAVE THE COURT 
DETERMINE THE AMOUNT AT A RESTITUTION HEARING; 
THUS, WHILE THE AMOUNT HAD YET TO BE DETERMINED, 
DEFENDANT KNEW THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA 
AND ENTERED IT KNOWINGLY 
Defendant asserts that "the State failed to disclose information pertinent to 
the terms of the [plea] agreement" and that she was thus "prevented from 
understanding the terms at the time of the plea." Br. Appellant at 16 (capitalization 
and boldface omitted). She claims that "the State's failure to disclose restitution 
amounts at the time of the plea agreement prevented [her] from understanding or 
knowing the consequences of the plea, or relevant terms of the agreement" and 
prevented her "from entering into a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea 
agreement." Id. at 26 (capitalization, italics, underlining, and boldface omitted). 
Specifically, defendant claims that her plea could not have been knowing 
because she was not informed that she might be ordered to pay restitution in the 
amount of $238,184.92, an amount yet to be determined when she entered her plea. 
See id. at 31. She claims that the order to pay this amount was a consequence of her 
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plea of which she was unaware, that she unknowingly entered the plea without an 
understanding of this consequence, and that the trial court therefore erred when it 
denied her motion to withdraw the plea.2 See Br. Appellant at 40-43. 
Defendant entered a knowing plea. Defendant knew that the amount of 
restitution was disputed, but agreed, as part of the plea bargain, to have the trial 
court determine the amount at a restitution hearing. Under such circumstances, she 
made a voluntary and intelligent choice to enter the plea, rather than go to trial. At 
least in most cases, a plea can be knowingly entered even when restitution has yet to 
2
 The plea in abeyance was entered on June 21,2004. Under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-13-6, a motion to withdraw a plea in abeyance must be made within 30 days of 
defendant's pleading guilty. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (West 2004). 
Defendant did not file her motion to withdraw until June 22, 2006. Defendant's 
plea statement, however, inaccurately informed defendant that she had to file a 
motion to withdraw "within 30 days after [she] ha[d] been sentenced and final 
judgment ha[d] been entered." R26. Defendant was not sentenced until March 18, 
2008. 
Under the rules of criminal procedure, "[fjailure to advise the defendant of 
the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty... is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a 
motion under Section 77-13-6." Rule 11(f), Utah R. Crim. P. 
The trial court treated defendant's motion to withdraw as a motion to extend 
the time for filing as well as a motion on the merits. See R143. For this reason, the 
State does not contest the timeliness of defendant's motion to withdraw. 
The State reserves the right, however, to argue in a future case that the 
statutory jurisdictional time limit cannot be circumscribed by a court rule. 
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be determined. To hold otherwise would substantially and unnecessarily limit the 
cases that could be resolved through plea bargaining. 
In any case, defendant knew what she had taken and therefore knew the 
amounts for which she might be responsible. Finally defendant has not rebutted the 
presumption that arose, upon the trial court's strict compliance with rule 11, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the plea was knowing and voluntary. 
A. Defendant, who knew that the amount of restitution was 
disputed and agreed in the plea statement to have the trial 
court determine the amount at a restitution hearing, 
knowingly entered her plea. 
This Court should reject defendant's claim. This case is not about the State's 
failure to disclose information. Both parties knew that the restitution amount was in 
dispute. Nothing in the record suggests that the State knew and hid information 
that defendant did not possess. Rather, the issue here is whether the State can offer 
and a defendant can knowingly enter a plea where the parties agree to have the trial 
court determine a disputed restitution amount at a restitution hearing. 
"The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is 
'whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the 
alternative courses of action open to the defendant/" Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,56 
(1985) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,31 (1970)); see also Parke v. Raley, 
506 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1992) (plea is valid when it is both knowingly and voluntarily 
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made); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969) (United States Constitution 
requires that guilty plea be intelligently and voluntarily entered). 
To knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter a plea, a defendant must 
understand the "direct consequences" or "basic consequences" of her decision to 
plead guilty. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,755 (1970) (referring to a guilty 
plea "entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences") (emphasis added); 
State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,111,22 P.3d 1242 (explaining that the purpose of rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is to help establish that a defendant knows her 
rights and understands the "basic consequences" of her decision to plead guilty). 
To enter a knowing and voluntary plea, a defendant should be aware of the 
constitutional rights she is waiving when she enters a guilty plea, in particular, the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the 
right to confront her accusers. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. at 243. She must also 
"understand the nature and elements of the crime to which she [is pleading] guilty." 
State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440,443 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant here understood the basic consequences of her plea. The plea 
statement establishes that defendant knew what the bargain was with respect to her 
sentence and other matters. She stated, "I know the maximum sentence that may be 
imposed for each crime to which I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading 
guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to 
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serving a mandatory penalty for that crime/' R23. She said that she knew that her 
sentence could include a prison term, fine, or both, and that in addition to a fine, an 
85% surcharge would be imposed. Id. 
She also understood the consequences of her plea relevant to restitution. She 
understood that she would have to pay restitution and that restitution could "be 
owed on charges that [we]re dismissed as part of a plea agreement/' See R23-24. 
She understood that the restitution amount for some of her criminal activities would 
be $55,220. See R24. She also understood that the restitution amount for other 
criminal activities was in dispute. See id. Understanding all of these matters, she 
agreed to have the trial court determine the disputed and total amounts at a 
restitution hearing. See R24. She knew what the bargain was and how the 
restitution amount would be determined. Significantly, while defendant could have 
appealed the trial court's determination of the restitution amount, she did not. See 
R40, 50. 
Defendant's plea was not unknowing or involuntary because the amount of 
restitution had yet to be determined. Defendant knew for exactly what conduct 
over exactly what period of time restitution could be imposed. She also knew that 
she was agreeing to have the court determine the amount of restitution after a 
hearing on the matter. 
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B. A plea can be knowingly entered even when restitution has yet 
to be determined. To hold otherwise would substantially and 
unnecessarily limit the cases that could be resolved through 
plea bargaining. 
1. A plea can be knowing even when entered without 
knowledge of the amount of restitution that may be 
required. 
A defendant can enter a knowing plea even when the amount of restitution 
has yet to be determined. First, when entering a plea, a defendant gives up her right 
to a trial and to those rights that would be constitutionally required at trial. See 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). She waives the right to have her guilt or innocence 
determined by a fact finder. But she does not waive the rights that she would be 
accorded at sentencing, including the right to challenge any restitution award and to 
have a hearing on that issue. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (West Supp. 2008) 
(providing for challenge to imposition, amount, or distribution of restitution and to 
full hearing on the issue). Defendant's claim, that the plea cannot be knowing 
unless a defendant knows, in advance, what restitution will be ordered, would 
make the entry of the plea something more than a waiver of the right to trial. It 
would make the entry of a plea insurance against the consequences and sentencing 
risks that defendants routinely face after they have been convicted at trial. 
Defendant has not explained why she should be entitled to such insurance upon 
entering a plea, where her entry of the plea does not waive any right to challenge a 
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restitution order at sentencing or her entitlement to a restitution hearing if she 
challenges the "imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution/' Id. 
Defendant, in fact, did challenge the restitution amount below. See R40, 50. She 
could have, but did not, appeal the trial court's rulings on her challenges. 
Moreover, while a defendant is entitled to know the basic or direct 
consequences of pleading guilty, the entry of a plea need not insure against all 
uncertainties. It is "simply impracticable for a trial judge to advise the defendant of 
all possible consequences" of entering a plea. W. LaFave et al, Criminal Procedure 
§ 21.4(d) (3d ed. 2007). Numerous jurisdictions accordingly have held that a 
restitution obligation is not a basic consequence of pleading guilty, that the trial 
court need not inform a defendant of the dollar amount of restitution before 
accepting a plea, and that a defendant can enter a knowing plea even where that 
dollar amount has not been ascertained. 
For instance, in State v. Groppi, 840 A.2d 42,44-45 (Conn. App. 2004), the court 
held that, while entry of a knowing plea required that "a defendant... be fully 
aware of the direct consequences of his or her plea," restitution was not a direct 
consequence of the plea itself. The court was therefore not required to ensure that 
Groppi had a full understanding of the relationship between his guilty plea and 
restitution. See id. 
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In State v. Hurt, 27 P.3d 1276, 1283 (Wash. App. 2001), overruled on other 
grounds by In re Carlstad, 80 P.3d 587 (Wash. 2003), Hurt "argue[d] that his guilty 
plea was not voluntary because he was not informed of the specifics of his 
restitution/' The court rejected his argument, noting that "[t]he usual procedure is 
for the precise amount of restitution to be determined at the time of sentencing, or 
within a given period thereafter/' Id. at 1283-84. The court reasoned, "Mr. Hurt was 
told he would be required to compensate the victim's family for their medical, 
funeral, and similar expenses. That is enough to support the guilty plea." Id. at 
1284. 
In State v. Hensley, 2006 WL 771175 (Minn. App. 2006) (unpublished) (attached 
in Addendum D), Hensley argued that he should have been allowed to withdraw 
his guilty plea because, where restitution had not been reduced to a specific dollar 
amount, "he was misled about the amount of restitution he was obligated to pay." 
Id. The court rejected defendant's argument. The court observed that "the plea 
agreement specifically addressed restitution and appellant was informed he would 
be responsible for restitution on the dismissed counts, even though no specific 
dollar amount of restitution was proposed." Id. The court held that, under the 
circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hensley's 
motion to withdraw because the record amply supported the trial court's 
15 
"conclusion that [Hensley] entered his guilty plea knowing that he would be 
responsible for restitution on all charges in the complaint." Id. 
In Alford v. State, 651 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994), Alford 
"contend[ed] that his plea was not voluntarily and intelligently entered 
because... he was not informed of the large amoimt of restitution that would be 
sought by the victim and, had he known of the amoimt of restitution being sought, 
he would not have pleaded guilty." Id. The court rejected his claim, holding that 
Alford "was fully aware of the consequences of his plea when it was entered. He 
was not misled in any way. There is no constitutional requirement that an accused 
be informed of every consequence of his guilty plea before the plea will be 
considered intelligently entered." Id. at 1113.3 
3
 Defendant cites three cases from other jurisdictions to support her argument 
that a defendant cannot enter a knowing plea unless she knows the amount of 
restitution that may be imposed. See Br. Appellant at 26. Two of the cases are 
distinguishable. In State v. Chapman, 362 N.W.2d 401 (Minn. App. 1985), the plea 
agreement did not mention the amount of restitution. However, the issue before the 
court was not whether the defendant had to be informed of the amoimt of 
restitution prior to the plea, but whether "the trial court err[ed] in requiring 
Chapman to make restitution of the sums alleged in the counts to which she did not 
plead guilty" and on the basis of conduct for which she did not agree to pay 
restitution. Id. at 403. 
(Footnote continues on following page.) 
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2. As a matter of policy, this Court should not require that a 
defendant know the amount of restitution before pleading 
guilty. 
Significantly, if this Court were to hold that a defendant could not enter a 
knowing plea unless she were informed of the amount of restitution, it would 
substantially limit the number of cases that could be resolved through plea 
bargaining. In many cases, at the time of the change-of-plea hearing, the 
prosecution does not know what amount of restitution may be required to 
compensate the victims for losses caused by the defendant. In some cases, where 
victims require continuing medical and mental health treatment, that figure cannot 
be known until after sentencing. If the prosecutor must provide an exact figure for 
restitution or even a "ceiling" on restitution at the change-of-plea hearing, the 
prosecutor may be reluctant to offer any plea. Likewise, the trial court, aware of its 
Defendant also cites State v. Tracy, 869 R2d 425 (Wash. App. 1994). In Tracy, 
the problem was not that the plea agreement did not apprise defendant of the 
amount of restitution, but that the plea agreement did not advise defendant about 
the possibility of restitution itself. Id. at 426. In the instant case, the plea statement 
did, in fact, inform the defendant of the possibility of restitution. 
Defendant's third case, State v. King, 759 P.2d 1312,1314 (Ariz. 1988), does 
appear to support her argument. King is not controlling precedent in Utah and, as 
explained in the foregoing analysis, is contrary to the precedent of many other 
jurisdictions. 
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responsibilities to victims, may be reluctant to accept any plea, knowing that by 
accepting the plea, the court may foreclose its avenues to fulfill its legal 
responsibilities to victims.4 
Moreover, defendant's claim that she could not enter a knowing plea that 
included an agreement to have the trial court determine restitution at a restitution 
hearing is inconsistent with statutory law that contemplates post-plea restitution 
hearings. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-203 requires that a presentence report include a 
victim impact statement regarding "the recommended amount of complete 
restitution/' It would make little sense to require this information between a 
change-of-plea hearing and sentencing if the amount of restitution had to be 
determined prior to the entry of a plea. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 provides for a 
full restitution hearing "at the time of sentencing" "[i]f the defendant objects to the 
imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution/' Id. (emphasis added). It 
4
 For instance, the Crime Victims Restitution Act states that "in addition to 
any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make 
restitution to victims of crimes as provided in this chapter, or for conduct for which 
the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l). The Act further requires court to determine "complete 
restitution" and "court-ordered restitution" and to "enter an order of complete 
restitution . . . on the civil judgment docket." Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38a-302(2) & 
401(1). 
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would make likewise make little sense to provide for a hearing at the time of 
sentencing if restitution had to be determined prior to the entry of a plea. 
C Moreover, in this case, defendant knew when she entered the 
plea what she had taken and was therefore aware of the 
amount of restitution she might be required to pay. 
Defendant can hardly argue surprise in this case. Defendant, better than 
anyone else, knew the amounts she had taken by fraudulently using her 
incapacitated aunt's credit cards, by making checks for her personal use against her 
aunt's account, and by mortgaging her aunt's home and converting the proceeds to 
her personal use. Defendant knew what she had taken and, therefore, knew the 
amount of restitution that might be required. She knew what her misappropriations 
were and she knew that they might be included in the amount of the restitution 
order. As explained, defendant does not appeal the trial court's determination that 
the restitution amount accurately reflected the value of the property 
misappropriated. See R40,50. While defendant may have hoped that some of her 
misappropriations would remain undiscovered, she cannot prevail on her claim that 
her plea was unknowing because she was unaware of what restitution might be 
required. While she asserts that the plea was unknowing, she has presented no 
evidence to establish that it was, in fact, unknowing. 
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D. Finally, in this case, the trial court strictly complied with rule 
11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defendant has not 
rebutted the presumption that arose, upon the trial court's 
strict compliance, that the plea was knowing and voluntary. 
As explained, a plea is knowing if entered "'[with] understanding of the 
nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea/" Santobello v. New York, 404 
U.S. 257, 262 n.l (1971) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11). Courts in Utah have 
determined that, in most cases, a defendant's plea will be knowing and voluntary if 
entered by a court that has strictly complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Strict compliance with rule 11(e), i.e., explaining a defendant's 
constitutional rights and the consequences of pleading guilty, supports a 
presumption that the plea was knowing and voluntary. See State v. Gamblin, 2000 
UT 44,111,1 P.3d 1108; see also State v. Martinez, 2001UT12, % 22,26 P.3d 203 ("It is 
well established that strict compliance with [rule 11(3), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure] creates a presumption that the plea was voluntarily entered.") (internal 
quotation and citation omitted); State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Utah 1986) 
(plurality opinion) (The primary purpose of rule 11(e) is "to insure that when a 
defendant enters a guilty plea and thereby waives important constitutional rights, 
such as the right to a jury trial, he or she acts freely and voluntarily, with full 
knowledge of the consequences of the plea/'). Moreover, the rule provides that 
"[ujnless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire 
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into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea." Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(e) (final paragraph). 
Here, defendant does not allege that the trial judge did not strictly comply 
with rule 11. The record, in fact, demonstrates that the judge did comply with that 
rule. See R19-29 (plea statement); R196:3-6 (plea colloquy). The court ascertained 
that defendant knew of the rights set forth in rule 11(e), understood the nature and 
elements of the offense, and knew the minimum and maximum sentence that could 
be imposed. R19-29; R196:3-6. The court further ascertained that there was a factual 
basis for the plea. R20; R196:6. Based on that compliance, a presumption arose that 
defendants plea was entered both voluntarily and knowingly. Defendant has 
offered no evidence to rebut that presumption. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, defendant entered a knowing plea. Defendant knew that the amount 
of restitution was disputed, but agreed, as part of her plea bargain, to have the trial 
court determine that amount. Defendant thus knew what the bargain was and 
knew the consequence of entering her plea. Her claim, that a plea cannot be 
knowing unless the amount of restitution has been ascertained, is counter to sound 
policy as it would substantially reduce the cases in which a plea agreement could be 
entered. It is also inconsistent with Utah's statutory law that contemplates post-plea 
proceedings to determine restitution. 
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Moreover, in this case, defendant knew what her exposure was. She knew 
what funds she had misappropriated and might be required to restore. Further, in 
this case, the trial court strictly complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The court's strict compliance gave rise to a presumption that the plea 
was knowing and voluntary. Defendant has not rebutted that presumption. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted September iff , 2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JEANNRB. INOUYE ' 
assistant Attorney General 
Counsel Jf or Appellee 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
Page 1 of2 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by 
counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be 
required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or 
guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by 
reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, 
the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A 
defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than 
felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a 
written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and 
may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the 
right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right 
to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the 
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that 
the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is 
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a 
substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense 
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if 
so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the 
plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a 
written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant has 
read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot 
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understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or 
translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or 
advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea 
of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may 
be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a misdemeanor 
crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise 
the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the plea, it is unlawful for the defendant to 
possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render 
the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea. 
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or 
recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other 
charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court. 
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the 
defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(i)(1)The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being 
made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(i)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the 
parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance 
of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and 
defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(i)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea 
agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either 
affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(j) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a 
conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, 
on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial 
motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other 
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if 
the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(I) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. Any 
variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall 
be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a 
collateral attack on a guilty plea. 
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Addendum B 
ORIGINAL 
WADE A. FARRAWAY - 5069 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF - 4666 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
5272 College Drive, #200 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801)281-1258 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
: IN SUPPORT OF PLEA IN ABEYANCE 
Plaintiff, : AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
vs. : Criminal No. 041900692 
JUDY GIBSON, : 
Defendant. : 
I, JUDY GIBSON, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and that I 
understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty to the following crime: 
Crime & Statutory Degree Punishment 
Provision Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
A. UNLAWFUL DEALING OF T Felony $10,000.00 fine and incarceration 
PROPERTY BY A for a term not less than one (1) year 
FIDUCIARY, §76-6-513(2) nor more than 15 years 
and/or (3)(a), Utah Code Ann. 
(1995, as amended) 
I have received a copy of the Information against me. I have read it, or had it 
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime to which I am pleading guilty. 
The elements of the crime to which I am pleading guilty are: 
I did knowingly or intentionally deal with property that had been entrusted to me as a fiduciary, 
or property of a governmental entity, public monies, or of a financial institution, in a manner 
which I knew was a violation of my duty and which involved substantial risk of loss or detriment 
to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted; and/or acting as a 
fiduciary, without permission of the owner of the property or some other person with authority to 
give permission, pledged as collateral for a personal loan, or as collateral for the benefit of some 
party, other than the owner or the person for whose benefit the property was entrusted, the 
property that has been entrusted to the fiduciary. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crime listed 
above. I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of 
other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept 
my guilty plea and prove the elements of the crime to which I am pleading guilty: 
I took monies entrusted to me and mismanaged them and used a power of attorney to secure a 
loan against Melba Wisdom's property without her permission. 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under 
the constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will give 
up all the following rights: 
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Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might 
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's 
service to me. 
I have not waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and 
that I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty. I 
also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty plea. 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is Richard Bird. My attorney and I 
have folly discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty plea. 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty. 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and b) 
my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-
examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State 
would pay those costs. 
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Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have 
a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to 
testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself I also know that if 
I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I 
am presumed iimocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime. If I choose to 
fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial At 
a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each 
juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be 
admitting that I committed the crime stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I 
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to 
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
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Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime 
to which I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory 
penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my 
sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crime, including any 
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the 
same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I 
plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another 
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea(s) now may 
result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading 
guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose 
consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences 
would be inappropriate. 
Plea bargain. My guilty plea is the result of a plea bargain between myself and the 
prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are 
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fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
1. I will plead guilty to Count I, Unlawful Dealing of Property by a Fiduciary, a Second 
Degree Felony. 
2. Count II, Theft by Deception, a Second Degree Felony, will be dismissed. 
3. The parties agree there is at least $55,220.00 due and owing in restitution in this 
matter. However, due to a dispute over other amounts, a restitution hearing is requested by the 
parties. The restitution amount to be determined at said hearing will cover the time period 
-T^h^GOe to October 31,2003. 
4. After determination at the restitution hearing, I will pay restitution in the amount of 
. Said restitution will be paid at the rate of at least S^^QoO per month, 
beginning one month from the date of the restitution hearing, and will be sent to the Medicaid 
Fraud Control Unit, Attention: Linda Snow, 5272 College Drive, #200, Murray, Utah 84123, for 
the benefit of Melba Wisdom to the various credit cards and other creditors identified at the 
restitution hearing. 
5. I will be placed on probation for 36 months, during which time I will remain a law 
abiding citizen. 
6. The State recommends no incarceration as long as defendant is in compliance with the 
terms of the Plea in Abeyance. 
7. The case will be dismissed upon successful completion of these terms. 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding 
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge 
may do are not binding on the judge. 
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Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those 
contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
lam years of age. I have attended school through the / S * ^ " grade. I can read and 
understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided 
to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would 
impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of 
any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or 
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea, I must file a written motion 
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to withdraw my plea within 30 days after I have been sentenced and final judgment has 
been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good cause. I will not 
be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any reason. 
Dated this j ^ / ^ d a y of (.J^AJL, , 2004. 
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Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for JUDY GIBSON the defendant above, and that I know 
she has read the statement or that I have read it to her; I have discussed it with her and believe 
that she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. 
To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the 
crime and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, 
along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing 
affidavit, are accurate and true. 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against JUDY GIBSON, 
defendant I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense is true and correct No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant The plea 
negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as 
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence 
would support the conviction of defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered and that the 
acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest. 
(jUo ^-
PROSECUTION ATTORNEY 
Bar No. 5069 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the 
signatures and finds that the defendant's guilty plea is freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty plea to the crime set forth in the 
Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this ^ ? / day of Hf^^t^ ^ ^ 2004. 
JUDGE *c 
11/2001 
h:gibson\stmtofdefinguiltyplea.2001/06-16-04 
Addendum C 
ROBERT E. STEED - 6036 WUII DISTRICT COURT 
Assistant Attorney General T W r d J u d i c |a) ^Strict 
MARK L.SHURTLEFF-4666 rjrn 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah SALT LA 
5272 College Drive, #200 B y — 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801)281-1258 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUDY GIBSON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 
Criminal No. 041900692 
Judge Ann Boyden 
Defendant, Judy Gibson, filed a Motion to Withdraw her Guilty Plea to one count of 
Exploitation of an Elder Adult, a Second Degree Felony. The State of Utah filed a written 
memoranda in response to the motion and oral argument was heard on October 2,2006. The 
defendant was present and was represented by Gretchen Havner and Bevan Corry of the Salt 
Lake Legal Defender's Office. The State of Utah was represented by Robert E. Steed, Assistant 
Attorney General. Based upon the pleadings on file, the evidence adduced, and 
argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby makes the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
JURISDICTION 
The Court finds that defendant's Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea was timely made. 
Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction to address defendant's motion. The Court notes that in 
response to the defendant's motion, the State conceded that the notice contained in the plea 
agreement pertaining to defendant's right to file a motion to withdraw her guilty plea erroneously 
stated that the defendant had to file any motion to withdraw her guilty plea within thirty days of 
the imposition of sentence. However, the law in effect when the plea was entered provided that 
'Tor a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of 
pleading guilty or no contest." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2004). However, the State 
suggested that the remedy for this error could be cured by allowing the defendant to file a motion 
to extend the time to file her motion. The Court finds that based on the notice contained in the 
plea agreement, defendant's motion was timely filed. Accordingly, the Court will address 
defendant's motion on its merits. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On February 3,2004, the State filed an Information charging the defendant with one 
count of Unlawful Dealing of Property by a Fiduciary, a second degree felony and one 
count of Theft by Deception, a second degree felony. 
2. On April 5,2004, the defendant made an initial appearance before the Court. Defendant 
was represented by counsel, Richard L. Bird. On May 25,2004, the defendant 
knowingly waived her right to a preliminary hearing and the case was bound over for 
trial. 
On June 21,2004, the defendant appeared with counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the 
charge of Unlawful Dealing of Property by a Fiduciary, a Second Degree Felony. The 
State and the defendant submitted a Statement of Defendant in Support of Plea in 
Abeyance and Certificate of Counsel. The Court questioned the defendant to ascertain 
whether she understood the legal consequences of entering a plea and to determine 
whether the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. After the Court was satisfied 
that the defendant was fully advised of her rights and consequences of entering a guilty 
plea, the Court accepted the defendant's plea and found that it was knowingly and 
voluntarily entered. 
Page 6 of the written plea in abeyance agreement contains the following terms and 
conditions that pertain defendant's obligation to pay restitution to the victim of her 
conduct: 
3. The parties agree there is at least $55,220.00 due and owing in restitution in this 
matter. However, due to a dispute over other amounts, a restitution hearing is 
requested by the parties. The restitution amount to be determined at said hearing 
will cover the time period April 7,2002 to October 31,2003. 
4. After determination at the restitution hearing, I will pay restitution in the 
amount of $ . Said restitution will be paid at the rate of at least 
$ .00 per month, beginning one month from the date of the restitution 
hearing, and will be sent to the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit... 
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In exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the State agreed to move to dismiss the remaining 
count in the Information. 
Page 7 of the plea agreement contains the following notice of defendant's right to 
withdraw her guilty plea: 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea, I must file a written motion 
to withdraw my plea within 30 days after I have been sentenced and final judgement 
has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good cause. I 
will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any reason. 
During the plea colloquy, the defendant denied at that time that she was under any undue 
influence or coercion to plead guilty. The written plea agreement also contained 
certification of voluntariness, attested to by the defendant, wherein she acknowledged that 
she was voluntarily entering into a plea agreement with the State of her own free will and 
choice and that no "force, threats, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made" 
to compel her to plead guilty." 
On October 8,2004, a restitution hearing was held and evidence was received by the 
Court. The Court heard testimony from Officer Charles Haussler, an investigator with the 
Medicaid Fraud Unit of the Attorney General's Office. The defendant was present with 
counsel and also testified on her own behalf. Based on the evidence, the Court made 
findings and ordered that the defendant pay restitution in the amount of $238,184.92. 
Further, the Court ordered that the defendant make restitution payments of $2,500 per 
month beginning on November 30, 2004. 
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On November 3,2004, the defendant filed a Motion to Amend the Restitution Order. 
The State responded in writing to the motion. After considering the merits of the 
defendant's motion, the Court denied the motion on November 8,2006. (Docket at 5-6.) 
The defendant did not file an appeal of the Court's restitution order or the denial of 
defendant's motion to modify that order. 
On January 4,2005, the State filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause with the Court 
based on the defendant's alleged failure to make restitution payments. On February 28, 
2005, an Order to Show Cause hearing was conducted and the defendant entered 
admissions to the allegations contained in the State's motion. The Court revoked and 
reinstated the defendant's plea in abeyance. (Docket at 6.) The defendant did not appeal 
the court's order with respect to the Order to Show Cause. 
On April 14, 2006, the State filed a second Order to Show Cause. A hearing on the 
State's motion was conducted on March 20, 2006. On that date, defendant's counsel, 
Richard Bird, withdrew from the case. The Court continued the hearing and appointed 
the Salt Lake Legal Defenders to represent the Defendant on March 28, 2006. 
On June 22, 2006, the second Order to Show Cause hearing was conducted. The State 
presented evidence in support of its motion. On the same date, the defendant filed a 
motion to withdraw her guilty plea claiming that her plea was not knowingly or 
voluntarily entered based on the fact that the plea agreement failed to specify a final 
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restitution amount. The defendant also claimed that her plea was involuntary because she 
was coerced into signing the agreement by her former counsel, Richard Bird. The 
defendant alleges via affidavit that her former counsel told her in June of 2004 that she 
had the choice of entering the plea agreement or going instantly to jail 
13. Oral argument on defendant's motion to withdraw was heard on October 2,2006. Both 
the State and the defendant were also permitted to provide evidence in support or against 
the defendant's motion. The defendant did not provide any additional evidence 
pertaining to her claim that she was coerced by former defense counsel, Richard Bird, 
into entering the plea agreement on June 21,2004. Further, defense counsel advised the 
Court that the State did not need to call Richard Bird to testify concerning defendant's 
claims of coercion though Mr. Bird was present and available to testify. No additional 
evidence was introduced at the hearing. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The issue before the Court is whether the defendant's guilty plea on June 21, 2004 was 
knowingly and voluntarily entered. The defendant contends that the plea agreement she signed 
failed to specify the total amount of restitution that was owing, as well as her monthly obhgation 
to make payments towards the total restitution amount. Consequently, the defendant claims that 
the plea agreement violated Rule 11(e)(6) which requires that the defendant be aware of the plea 
negotiations and what agreement has been reached prior to entering a plea. Absent a final 
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restitution amount in the plea agreement, the defendant argues that she was not in a position to 
know whether her compliance with the plea agreement was possible. The defendant argued that 
the lack of specificity is particularly important with respect to a plea in abeyance because the 
defendant's compliance with the terms and conditions of the agreement would determine whether 
the case is ultimately dismissed or whether a conviction is entered. 
The disputed language of the plea agreement states: 
3. The parties agree there is at least $55,220.00 due and owing in restitution in this 
matter. However, due to a dispute over other amounts, a restitution hearing is 
requested by the parties. The restitution amount to be determined at said hearing 
will cover the time period April 7,2002 to October 31,2003. 
4. After determination at the restitution hearing, I will pay restitution in the 
amount of $ . Said restitution will be paid at the rate of at least 
$ .00 per month, beginning one month from the date of the restitution 
hearing, and will be sent to the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit . . . 
While the total restitution amount was not stipulated to along with the defendant's monthly 
restitution payment amount, it is apparent that the parties understood and agreed to further 
litigate this issue with the Court. The defendant signed the plea agreement stating that she knew 
and understood that she owed restitution to the victim, including a minimum amount of $55,220. 
The defendant also understood that there was a dispute as to the final amount owing and 
agreed that a restitution hearing would be held to determine the final restitution amoimt. In fact, 
a restitution hearing was scheduled following the entry of defendant's plea. The agreement 
further states that the state is limited to a specified time period in which to present additional 
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evidence relating to restitution. The agreement does not necessarily work to either parties 
advantage or disadvantage because neither party knew at the time of the entry of the plea what 
the final restitution amount would be. 
Rule 11(e)(6) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that before accepting a 
guilty plea, the Court must find that "if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion 
and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached." The Court is satisfied based 
on the language of the plea agreement that the defendant understood what it was she was 
agreeing to. The Court finds that Rule 11(e)(6) does not require that restitution be determined to 
the last detail before a defendant can enter into a plea agreement, whether it be a plea in abeyance 
or a regular plea. The Court notes that restitution hearings are often required or requested 
following entry of a plea and the law provides a means for the Court to address restitution issues 
following a guilty plea. Pursuant to section 77-2a-3(5)(b)(2002), the court may upon acceptance 
of a plea in abeyance agreement order that restitution be paid to victims "as provided in Title 77, 
Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act." See, Utah Code Ann. §77-2a-3(5)(b) (2002). If a 
dispute exists over restitution, the Court shall conduct a hearing to determine the amount of 
restitution that is owing. See, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38(a)-302(4)(2003),and § 77-2a-
3(5)(b)(2004). 
The Court also finds that the mere fact that this was a plea in abeyance agreement rather 
than an ordinary plea agreement does not alter the Court's analysis. A plea in abeyance is 
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different in one aspect from an ordinary plea agreement because a plea in abeyance agreement 
allows the Court to withhold entering judgment for a specified period of time during which the 
defendant must comply with certain terms and conditions. If the defendant complies with the 
agreement, the plea may be ultimately withdrawn and the charges that were pled to can be 
dismissed or reduced according to the agreement. However, aside from this difference, a plea in 
abeyance is still a plea of guilty or "no contest" and requires that the Court comply with the same 
rules and Constitutional protections as are found in an ordinary plea agreement. In the instant 
case, the plea in abeyance agreement advises the defendant of the charges against her and advises 
her of all of the rights she is entitled to under the Constitution and all the rights she would be 
giving up by entering a plea of guilty. The agreement also contains a factual basis for 
defendant's plea and explains what the State is agreeing to in exchange for defendant's guilty 
plea, including the dismissal of other charges that were filed against the defendant. 
In short, the Court treats a plea in abeyance agreement the same as an ordinary plea 
agreement and must assure that the defendant is afforded all of the same protections and rights 
and complies with the same rules as with any other plea. In the instant case, the Court entered 
the defendant's plea only after being satisfied that the defendant was advised of her rights and 
that her plea complied with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Following the entry of the plea, a restitution hearing was conducted and the Court 
determined the full restitution amount and established the monthly payment schedule the 
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defendant was to comply with. The Court notes that the defendant did not file an appeal to 
challenge the Court's restitution order. Moreover, the defendant did not appeal a subsequent 
order by the Court finding her in violation of her plea agreement for failure to comply with the 
Court's Order on restitution. However, the issue before the Court is not the final restitution 
amount, nor the fact that the restitution hearing went one way or the other, but whether the 
defendant knowingly entered into the agreement with the restitution amount to be determined at 
the restitution hearing. The Court finds that the defendant's entry of this plea was knowingly and 
voluntarily entered with respect to that issue. 
The Court also finds that defendant's claim that she was coerced into entering by her 
former counsel is without merit. The record reflects that during the plea colloquy the Court 
specifically asked the defendant whether she was pleading guilty of her own free will and she 
responded affirmatively. Furthermore, based on the pleadings of the party and the statements of 
defense counsel during oral argument effectively withdrawing this as a claim before the Court, I 
find that the defendant's plea was voluntarily made and was not the result of coercion or undue 
influence from any source. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea is 
denied. ^mw ^ *MT M?yl \ 
ORDERED this26_ day of November, 2006. / f X ' 7 ' ' . " . \ \ 
JUDGE ANN BOYDEti'. .-,
 y y 
DISTRICT COURT JUDOrE. 'S^ ^ - .f/ 
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION 
DIETZEN, Judge. 
*1 In this consolidated direct and postconviction 
appeal, appellant challenges the district court orders 
and judgments denying his petition for 
postconviction relief and determining restitution, 
arguing that the district court erred by: (1) refusing to 
allow withdrawal of his guilty plea; (2) ordering 
appellant to pay restitution of $11,200; and (3) 
denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. 
Because we conclude that the district court properly 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. 
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applied the law and did not abuse its discretion, we 
affirm. 
FACTS 
In April 2003, appellant Robert Hensley was charged 
with second-degree burglary in violation of 
Minn.Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2 (2002), and offering a 
forged check in violation of Minn.Stat. g 609.631. 
subd. 3 (2002), after he was identified in a 
surveillance video forging checks taken during a 
March 31, 2003 burglary. In searches of appellant's 
hotel room and vehicle, law enforcement officers 
discovered stolen property belonging to the burglary 
victims. 
Following the burglary, the victims submitted an 
Inventory of Loss form to the sheriffs department 
listing the stolen property. The form included 
estimated values for some, but not all, of the 
property, which totaled $3,250. 
In October 2003, appellant, represented by legal 
counsel, signed a plea petition. The petition indicated 
that appellant would plead guilty to an amended 
count of receiving stolen property; and that the 
parties would recommend that appellant receive a 21-
month sentence and pay restitution "on all charges in 
[the] complainf'At the plea hearing, appellant 
confirmed that there would be "restitution on all 
charges [sic] that ... were dismissed."The district 
court clarified that restitution was for both the forged 
checks and the property stolen from the victims' 
residence, and appellant indicated that he understood. 
When the district court ordered a pre-sentence 
investigation (PSI), appellant's counsel requested that 
the investigation consider reducing the amount of 
restitution by the value of the items recovered from 
appellant. 
The victims submitted an Affidavit for Restitution to 
the district court. The affidavit included $6,720 in 
lost wages, $6,000 in jewelry, $5,000 of tools, $3,000 
for 400 movies, $300 in personal belongings, and 
$600 for a pager. The total loss was estimated at 
$21,620, and was not covered by insurance. The PSI 
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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recommended that appellant pay the amount of 
restitution stated in the affidavit. 
Following a sentencing hearing, appellant received a 
19-month sentence and was ordered to pay $22,150 
in restitution. Appellant requested, and the district 
court ordered, a hearing to determine the amount of 
restitution. 
At the restitution hearing, one of the victims testified 
in support of the total amount of restitution requested 
in the affidavit; for lost wages for the four months 
she did not attend work so that the home was 
protected from theft; and for nearly $800 of forged 
checks that were cashed and not reimbursed by her 
bank. The victim also explained that the initial 
Inventory of Loss form was completed before she 
had a chance to thoroughly search their home for 
missing items and determine the value of the stolen 
property. 
*2 The district court ordered restitution in the amount 
of $11,200. This amount was based on $6,000 for the 
stolen jewelry; $3,500 for tools; $1,200 for movies; 
$300 for personal belongings; and $200 for the pager. 
The district court rejected the claim for lost wages. 
Appellant appealed the order for restitution, but then 
filed a motion to stay the appeal and remand for 
postconviction proceedings, which this court granted. 
In March 2005, appellant filed his petition for 
postconviction relief, challenging the amount of 
restitution, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea and 
vacate his conviction based on the amount of 
restitution, and requesting an evidentiary hearing. 
The district court summarily denied the petition 
without holding an evidentiary hearing. 
DECISION 
A petition for postconviction relief is a collateral 
attacks on the judgment, which carries a presumption 
of regularity and, therefore, cannot be lightly set 
aside. Pederson v. Stale, 649 N.W.2d 161, 163 
(Minn.2002). This court will not disturb the decision 
of a postconviction court unless the court abused its 
discretion. Dukes v State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 251 
(Minn.2001). This court reviews "a postconviction 
court's findings to determine whether there is 
sufficient evidentiary support in the record" and will 
not reverse a district court's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous. Id. Conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo. Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333. 
338 (Minn.2003). 
L 
Appellant raises three issues on appeal. First, 
appellant argues that the district court abused its 
discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. Specifically, appellant argues that he was 
misled about the amount of restitution he was 
obligated to pay. Respondent contends that 
appellant's plea was knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent; and that appellant explicitly agreed that he 
would be responsible for restitution on all charges in 
the complaint, not just those amounts for which he 
admitted liability. 
Whether a district court properly denied a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed under an abuse-of-
discretion standard. Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 
266 (Minn. 1989). A criminal defendant has no 
absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea once it is 
entered. State v. Rhodes, 675 N.W.2d 323. 326 
(Minn.2004). But a defendant may withdraw a guilty 
plea if withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest 
injustice. Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.05. subd. 1; Alanis v. 
State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn. 1998) (stating that 
burden of proof to establish basis for plea withdrawal 
rests with defendant). Manifest injustice exists when 
a defendant can show that a guilty plea was not 
"accurate, voluntary, and intelligent (i .e., knowingly 
and understanding^ m&do)" Perkins v. State, 559 
N.W.2d 678. 688 (Minn. 1997). 
The crux of appellant's argument is that his guilty 
plea must be withdrawn because he was only 
obligated to pay restitution for the amounts for which 
he admitted liability, and not for all amounts charged 
in the complaint. But this argument is contradicted by 
the record. The plea petition explicitly states that 
appellant would be responsible for restitution "on all 
charges in [the] complaint," which included the 
second-degree burglary charge. At the plea hearing, 
appellant, who was represented by counsel, stated 
several times that he understood that restitution 
would be on all charges in the complaint. On this 
record, appellant's guilty plea was made knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently. See State v. Ecker, 524 
N.W.2d 712. 719 (Minn. 1994) (holding that 
contested plea was voluntary because defendant 
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repeatedly stated on record that he was making his 
own decision). 
*3 Appellant nonetheless argues that his guilty plea 
was not valid because he believed that the restitution 
would not be more than the value of the items listed 
in the Inventory of Loss form. Appellant relies on 
two cases to support the invalidity of his guilty plea. 
See State v. Noreen, 354 N.W.2d 77 
(Minn.App. 1984); see also State v Chapman, 362 
N.W.2d401 (Minn.App.1985), review denied (Minn. 
May 1, 1985). In Noreen, this court considered the 
issue of restitution not bargained-for in the plea 
agreement where the district court ordered restitution 
of $2,000 at sentencing. 354 N.W.2d at 78.This court 
remanded for resentencing, stating "the defendant 
must understand the consequences of his plea. In this 
case, the trial court imposed additional conditions of 
probation which were not contemplated by the plea 
agreement."/** (citation omitted). 
In Chapman, the central issue was restitution ordered 
on dismissed counts. 362 N.W.2d at 403.In that case, 
the defendant contemplated owing restitution on the 
two counts to which she pleaded guilty and, prior to 
sentencing, no mention was made of restitution on 
the six counts to be dismissed. Id Thus, this court 
held that the $31,000 difference between what the 
defendant contemplated as restitution for the charged 
counts and the amount ordered at sentencing, which 
included the dismissed counts, so substantially 
exceeded the terms of the plea agreement that it was 
not voluntarily and intelligently entered. Id at 404. 
But Noreen and Chapman are easily distinguishable. 
Here, unlike Noreen, the plea agreement specifically 
addressed restitution and appellant was informed that 
he would be responsible for restitution on the 
dismissed counts, even though no specific dollar 
amount of restitution was proposed. 354 N.W.2d at 
78.And, unlike Chapman, the amount of restitution 
contemplated by appellant, i.e., the $3,250 amount in 
the Inventory of Loss form, was not justified on this 
record. A review of the Inventory of Loss form 
reveals that it was a preliminary document, i.e., that it 
was cursory and incomplete. Appellant's counsel 
acknowledged at the plea hearing that the amount of 
restitution would be investigated and set forth in the 
PSI. Thus, we reject appellant's argument that he was 
misled about the consequences of his guilty plea. 
We believe the conclusion that appellant entered his 
guilty plea knowing that he would be responsible for 
restitution on all charges in the complaint is amply 
supported by the record. Therefore, the district court 
did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's 
request to withdraw his guilty plea. 
n. 
Second, appellant argues that the evidence in the 
record does not support the district court order of 
restitution in the amount of $11,200. Respondent 
contends that the victim's testimony was sufficient to 
establish the property that was stolen and its 
approximate value. 
Under Minnesota law, when an offender is convicted 
of a crime, the victim has a right to restitution, 
including but not limited to "out-of-pocket losses 
resulting from the crime[.1"Minn.Stat. § 611A.04, 
subd. 1(a) (2004). The sentencing court has wide 
discretion in ordering and determining the 
appropriate amount of restitution. State v. Anderson. 
507 N.W.2d 245, 246 (Minn.App. 1993), review 
denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 1993). But the record must 
provide a factual basis for the amount awarded by 
showing the nature and amount of losses with 
reasonable specificity. State v. Thole, 614 N.W.2d 
231. 234 (Minn.App.2000). 
*4 An offender who challenges the propriety of 
including in a restitution order particular items or the 
dollar amounts of those items has the burden of 
producing evidence to support the challenge. 
Minn.Stat. § 611A.045. subd. 3(a) (2004). The 
ultimate burden of establishing the appropriateness 
and the amount of restitution is on the prosecution. 
Id "A dispute as to the proper amount or type of 
restitution must be resolved by the court by the 
preponderance of the evidence."/** 
Here, one of the victims testified at the restitution 
hearing as to the stolen property and its approximate 
value. She described with specificity the items that 
were stolen, and the actual value of many of the items 
based on her recollection of purchasing the items, the 
replacement cost, or catalog pricing. She explained 
that some of the values were estimates because her 
receipts were taken during the burglary, and many 
items were purchased overseas. She explained that 
the amount shown in the initial Inventory of Loss 
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form was low because it was made without knowing 
the fUll extent of the loss and without an opportunity 
to study the value of the items. 
Appellant argues that the victim's testimony was 
unsubstantiated, and therefore, the state did not meet 
its burden. But this court has allowed restitution that 
is supported by affidavits, claim forms, or testimony. 
See e.g., State v. O'Brien, 459 N.W.2d 131, 133 
(Minn.App. 1990) (finding sufficient evidence based 
on victim's affidavit of costs and testimony). Here, 
the only two witnesses at the restitution hearing were 
appellant and the victim. On matters of credibility, 
we defer to the district court. State v. Dickerson, 481 
N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 19921 We conclude that the 
determination of the district court is supported by the 
record. 
*5 Affirmed. 
Minn.App.,2006. 
State v. Hensley 
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2006 WL 771175 
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III. 
Third, appellant argues that the district court abused 
its discretion when it denied his request for an 
evidentiary hearing on his petition for postconviction 
relief because he placed material facts in dispute 
regarding the validity of his guilty plea. 
The district court must grant an evidentiary hearing 
for a postconviction appeal "[u]nless the petition and 
the files and records of the proceeding conclusively 
show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief 
n"Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2004). An 
evidentiary hearing is necessary when there is a 
material issue of fact in dispute. State ex rel Roy v. 
Tahash 277 Minn. 238, 244-45, 152 N.W.2d 301, 
305-06 (1967). To place material facts in dispute, the 
petitioner must allege facts that, if proven, would 
entitle the petitioner to the requested relief. Fratzke v. 
State. 450 N.W.2d 101, 102 
(Minn. 1990)."f Allegations raised in the petition 
must be more than argumentative assertions without 
factual support"Sutherlin v. State, 574 N.W.2d 428, 
436 (Minn. 1998) (citation omitted). 
Here, the record is clear that appellant was informed 
prior to entering his guilty plea that restitution would 
be required on all counts charged in the complaint. 
Consequently, appellant's reliance on the amount 
stated in the Inventory of Loss form was unjustified. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying the request for an evidentiary hearing. 
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